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Abstract 
  
The ongoing search for life on other worlds and the prospects of eventual human 
exploration of the Moon and Mars indicate the need for new ethical guidelines to direct 
our actions as we search and how we respond if we discover microbial life on other 
worlds. Here we review how life on other worlds presents a novel question in 
environmental ethics. We propose a principle of protecting and expanding the richness 
and diversity of life as the basis of an ethic for astrobiology research and space 
exploration.  There are immediate implications for the operational policies governing 
how we conduct the search for life on Mars and how we plan for human exploration 
throughout the Solar System. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140013435 2019-08-31T17:06:38+00:00Z
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Introduction 
 
Since the first space flights, the only ethical guidelines for space exploration have been 
the planetary protection policies based on Article IX of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  
Article IX states that exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be 
conducted in a way “so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes 
in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter.”    
The current interpretation of Article IX is the prevention of contamination that would 
adversely impact further scientific investigations; that is, the chief focus has been 
protecting the science investigations done by humans (COSPAR 2005). 
 
This status quo was called into question by the National Academy of Science in its 2006 
review of planetary protection procedures (NAS 2006).  Their challenge could have a far-
reaching regulatory impact on astrobiology research, and it is important that researchers 
are aware of these questions as they are debated and policy is developed.  The National 
Academy recommended examining whether there are additional ethical considerations 
for space exploration.  Specifically, the National Academy wrote: "In light of new 
knowledge about Mars and the diversity and survivability of terrestrial microorganisms in 
extreme environments, NASA should work with COSPAR and other appropriate 
organizations to convene, at the earliest opportunity, an international workshop to 
consider whether planetary protection policies for Mars should be extended beyond 
protecting the science to include protecting the planet. This workshop should focus 
explicitly on (1) ethical implications and the responsibility to explore Mars in a manner 
that minimizes the harmful impacts of those activities on potential indigenous biospheres 
(whether suspected or known to be extant), (2) whether revisions to current planetary 
protection policies are necessary to address this concern, and (3) how to involve the 
public in such a dialogue about the ethical aspects of planetary protection."   
 
In 2010, COSPAR held an international workshop to begin studying these ethical issues 
and a second workshop is planned. Eventually, the basis of international Planetary 
Protection policy may shift from preserving future science to other operational policies.  
These new operational policies should be grounded in a clearly defined ethical foundation 
that has support among astrobiologists, government policy makers, and the public. 
 
This ethic for space exploration must be broadly representative of the human species 
because space explorers represent the entire human species, regardless of what 
government or corporation sponsors their mission.  Internationally, this is already 
recognized, implicitly, in the COSPAR planetary protection protocols as well as the 
Outer Space Treaty.  An ethic for space exploration must be framed in a manner that 
resonates with a diversity of ethical viewpoints and grounds planetary protection policies 
that will guide national and trans-national organizations, such as NASA and COSPAR, as 
well as private, commercial enterprises, such as Armadillo Aerospace, Space X, etc.  
An ethic for astrobiology must necessarily be an inter-species ethic, similar to the work 
done in environmental ethics over the past 50 years.  At the same time, an ethic for 
astrobiology will contain several key distinctions from conventional environmental 
ethics.  First, the most likely discovery scenario involves finding a non-intelligent, non-
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sentient organism somewhere in the Solar System.  Most likely this extraterrestrial life 
will be microbial.  Therefore, a core challenge for astrobiology ethics concerns what 
duties and obligations are owed to microbes.  By contrast, environmental ethics for Earth 
rarely reflects on microbes.  As Cockell (2005, 2008) has pointed out, we kill millions of 
microbes daily in order to live safe and healthy lives.  In addition, microbes are so small 
that it is difficult to know whether our ethics should be on individual microbes or 
“communities of microbes,” provided we could develop criteria for defining what counts 
as a microbial community (Cockell 2005).    
 
A second important difference from (terrestrial) environmental ethics could emerge if 
extraterrestrial life proves to be a “second genesis” (McKay 2001).  That is, a second 
origin of life, completely independent and biochemically distinct from the unity of life 
that we know on Earth.  In this scenario, an important ethical question arises whether the 
extraterrestrial’s very distinctiveness confers a special ethical status that sets it apart for 
special respect and consideration.  Should we ascribe extraordinary value to 
extraterrestrial life simply because it represents life with a separate origin from life as we 
know it on Earth, as suggested by McKay (2009a)?   
 
A third and final distinction involves the problem of predation, a problem all inter-species 
ethics must address.  Human predation extends beyond merely consuming other species 
for nourishment.  For instance, the extermination of malaria-carrying mosquitoes is a 
necessary form of predation in order to avoid malaria outbreaks.  Human predation may 
also occur in science, as when laboratory animals are killed in order to study the effect of 
disease.  Predation of extraterrestrial organisms would inevitably occur during space 
exploration, both on human or robotic missions.  Forms of extraterrestrial predation 
would include destruction of habitats, either accidently or intentionally, and the return of 
samples to Earth.  However, there is a difference in the character of predation.  Much of 
predation here on Earth is required for human survival and flourishing.  By contrast, all 
of the predation on extraterrestrial bodies would be discretionary because it is not 
required for human survival and flourishing on Earth.  Instead, we have freely chosen to 
leave our planet and visit extraterrestrial bodies that are not part of our home domain.  As 
a species we freely choose to explore space and hence all predation of extraterrestrial 
organisms is discretionary.  This does not mean that predation of extraterrestrial 
organisms is inherently unjustifiable. But, it is important to acknowledge this important 
distinction between mandatory predation on Earth and discretionary predation when we 
interact with life on other worlds.   
 
We believe that new operational policies for space exploration and astrobiology research 
must be developed within an ethical framework that values sustaining and expanding the 
richness and diversity of life.  In what follows, we will develop our proposal for an 
ethical framework for space exploration, explain our arguments in support of this 
framework, as well as consider and reply to a potential criticism.  A new policy, if set at 
the international level has a good chance of succeeding.  It is ironic that principles of 
environmental ethics established by international agreement are more effectively 
implemented for space exploration than environmental policies on Earth.  This is because 
space exploration requires a large organized effort usually at the governmental level and 
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will remain so for the foreseeable future.  This makes implementation of policy – such as 
the current planetary protection policy – practical.   
 
Protecting and Expanding the Richness and Diversity of Life 
 
Historically, there have been two major types of ethical systems:  (1) a principles 
approach and (2) a goal approach.  The first approach specifies a set of duties or 
principles that must be followed at all times.  In the second approach, ethical decisions 
must be made based upon an over-riding goal, such as promoting the greatest amount of 
good.  The principles approach has proven to be very effective for organizations seeking 
to establish a code of ethics, such as a code of professional ethics for some occupation.  
However, the principles approach has difficulty with inter-species (or environmental) 
ethics because the principles are not intended to apply equally to different species.  In 
environmental ethics, for instance, we would apply a principle prohibiting harm 
differently to humans versus domestic animals that we consume as food.  Since an ethics 
framework for astrobiology would be an inter-species ethic, we propose an ethical 
framework that takes the second, goal approach (Singer, 2009).  
 
Our proposed ethics goal is that COSPAR operational policies should be designed to 
protect and expand the richness and diversity of life—both here on Earth and on 
extraterrestrial bodies that we explore.  Similarly, astrobiology research projects should 
always be designed so as to protect or expand the richness and diversity of life.   
 
How we value non-human organisms is a critical component of any inter-species ethic.  
There are two types of valuation that are important for our proposal:  (1) intrinsic value 
and (2) instrumental value.  Our ethics framework recognizes both intrinsic and 
instrumental value in all living organisms.  Intrinsic value means that every organism has 
value in and of itself, regardless of what instrumental utility it may, or may not, have for 
humans.  We believe that ascribing intrinsic value to all living organisms is warranted, 
given that all living organisms share life in common with humans.  Acknowledging that 
all living organisms possess intrinsic value does not preclude predation in order to 
promote human flourishing, but it does create an important baseline of respect that 
provides a check against unjustified or excessive predation. 
 
Whereas intrinsic value creates a needed baseline of respect, we also recognize the 
importance of instrumental value.  Instrumental value emerges when something has 
utility.  We usually think of instrumental value in terms of what has utility for humans, 
but our understanding of instrumental value needs to be expanded beyond what simply 
has utility for humans.  In environmental ethics, for example, clean water has utility for 
humans because we depend upon it in order to live healthy, flourishing lives.  Yet, clean 
water also has instrumental value for non-human organisms.   
 
Our ethic attributes intrinsic value to all living organisms, while recognizing that many 
organisms may have important instrumental value, as well.  In addition, some non-living 
ecological features, such as clean water in the illustration above, also have significant 
instrumental value.  Although we do not attribute intrinsic value to objects or features 
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that are not living, we do recognize that instrumental value may be attributed by humans 
to nonliving objects.  
 
The status of microbial organisms raises special challenges for ascribing intrinsic and 
instrumental value.  As already noted, the most likely discovery scenario would involve 
detection of an extraterrestrial microbe.  Should an astrobiology ethic attribute intrinsic 
and instrumental value even to microbes?  Focusing only on microbial life here on Earth, 
Cockell (2005, 2008) argues that we should attribute both intrinsic and instrumental value 
to all microbes, “including viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, and nematodes.”   The 
instrumental value of microbes is relatively straightforward, according to Cockell:  
“Microbes have become so pervasive that they are responsible for cycling all the major 
nutrients and elements in the biosphere and for creating the large-scale productivity 
needed for the ‘complex’ biosphere to exist.  … Without nitrogen fixing and denitrifying 
bacteria, we and all other life could not exist.”   In addition, microbes are critical in the 
fermentation of beer and wine, as well as the production of yogurt and antibiotics.   It is 
reasonable to presume that microbes would contribute to extraterrestrial life processes in 
a similar manner and thus have obvious instrumental value.   
 
Whereas the instrumental value of microbes is fairly straightforward, the question of their 
intrinsic value is more subtle.  Even though microbes are unconscious, Cockell believes 
we can still discern their “interests.”  He observes that microbes “reproduce, they grow in 
perferred places and directions (in the case of colonies), and many species are motile; 
they swim toward nutrients and away from chemicals that might damage them and 
prevent them from reproducing (‘chemotaxis’).”   Cockell argues that in discerning the 
“interests” of the microbe, we should experience a reverence or “biorespect” for 
microbes.  For Cockell, this “biorespect implies intrinsic value for microbes from the 
individual to community scale.”   Although we can recognize the intrinsic value of 
microbes, Cockell acknowledges that we cannot avoid destroying microbes on a practical 
level.   
 
Cockell’s argument parallels our understanding of the possibilities and limitations for an 
astrobiology ethic that attributes intrinsic value to all living organisms, even microbes.  
Recognizing this intrinsic value creates a baseline of respect for all of life, but it does not 
preclude the inevitable taking of non-human life for ethically informed reasons, such as 
predation.  We would extend intrinsic value—with these qualifications—to all 
extraterrestrial life. 
 
The “precautionary principle” is an additional key axiom which requires discussion.  
Over the years, the “precautionary principle” has been widely debated and writers have 
proposed multiple definitions.  Based upon discussions at the 2010 COSPAR workshop 
on ethics in space exploration, we define the “precautionary principle” as an axiom which 
calls for further investigation in cases of uncertainty before interference that is likely to 
be harmful to Earth and other extraterrestrial bodies, including life, ecosystems, and 
biotic and abiotic environments (COSPAR Workshop, 2010).  Space exploration in the 
future could frequently encounter new and unfamiliar living organisms and ecosystems.  
Given the value of life, we believe it is important that we act only after gathering enough 
 6 
 
 
information so that we can act in ways that will protect and expand the richness and 
diversity of life.   
 
As a brief illustration of how our proposed ethic would apply, consider the question of 
contamination on the surface of Mars.  It is unlikely that the Martian surface contains life, 
primarily because it would be quickly killed by exposure to ultraviolent radiation from 
the Sun.  While we can thoroughly sterilize space equipment prior to launch through 
heat-sterilization, our ethics proposal would not require sterilization because it does not 
appear possible for life from Earth to grow on the surface.  Contamination from Earth 
would be destroyed or remain dormant inside protective containers.  Consequently, there 
is little chance that forward contamination would undermine our ethics goal of protecting 
and expanding the richness and diversity of life.  However, there could be future 
scenarios where human explorers may choose to remove any dormant contamination in 
advance of altering the environment of Mars.  McKay (2009b) has already argued that 
making the exploration of Mars biologically reversible should be part of ethics for space 
exploration.   Although UV radiation makes it unlikely that life exists on the surface, it is 
still possible that life could exist in protected areas such as caves or subsurface aquifers.  
A more thorough sterilization would be required for equipment entering these protected 
areas on Mars, since forward contamination of indigenous life would undermine our 
overarching ethical goal of protecting and expanding the richness and diversity of life on 
Mars.   
 
Suppose that an ecosystem of diverse life were discovered in a Martian cave protected 
from UV radiation.  As noted, our ethics framework would allow human predation of 
non-human organisms provided that the predation was proportionate and did not 
jeopardize the long-term viability of the species or ecosystem.  The study and return of 
samples of extraterrestrial microbial life to Earth could be ethical in our proposal.  
However, given the lack of knowledge about newly discovered extraterrestrial life, our 
ethics proposal would require a period of non-contact observation and study of the 
extraterrestrial organisms in situ before interference with the ecosystem or the return of 
samples to Earth.  During this preliminary period of study, astrobiologists should develop 
an understanding of what the extraterrestrial organisms require in order to flourish and 
how the eco-system promotes that flourishing.  It would also be important to develop an 
understanding of potential threats of backward contamination posed by sample return and 
what protection protocols must be in place at the receiving laboratories on Earth. 
 
Finally, suppose that this new Martian ecosystem contains organisms that represented a 
“second genesis” or origin of life that was different than life found on Earth.  In ethical 
reflection on this scenario, the perspective on “second genesis” is important.  From the 
human view, the Martian organisms are unique and different, hence a “second genesis” of 
life.  However, from the Martian perspective, it is humans and other organisms on Earth 
that constitute a “second genesis.”  Regardless of the frame of reference, our ethics 
proposal would affirm the intrinsic value of the Martian organisms because it recognizes 
intrinsic value in all of life and the diversity that is represented in a second genesis.  This 
creates a baseline of “biorespect.”  We acknowledge that a “second genesis” would have 
added instrumental value from a human point of view because of its promise for research 
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and then perhaps other applications as well.  Both the intrinsic and instrumental values 
are captured in our overarching goal to protect and expand the richness and diversity of 
life.   
 
Considerations in Favor of Our Proposal 
 
There are two over-riding considerations that favor an ethics of protecting and expanding 
the richness and diversity of life.  First, as noted above, an ethic for space exploration 
must be broadly representative of the human species.  This is a daunting challenge.  
There is a broad and profound pluralism among human persons.  Humans are shaped and 
informed by a plethora of religions and philosophies that create a rich diversity of ethical 
values.   To establish a space ethic in the face of such overwhelming pluralism, we must 
find a common anchor-point; that is, a value that is common to this multitude of ethical 
perspectives around the world.  We believe that this common anchor-point is actually 
very simple and straightforward—it is simply, life.  Despite multiple differences in 
culture, religion, and custom, living is one reality that all persons share in common with 
one another as well as with nonhuman animals, plants, and microbes here on Earth.  If we 
discover extraterrestrial organisms, whether it is a humble microbe on Mars or a vastly 
superior space traveler from another planet, we will share life in common.  Life is a key 
value in virtually every religion of the world, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism.  Life is also a key value in most non-religious philosophies.   
A strength of our ethics framework is that it builds on this common anchor-point, by 
establishing the protection and maintenance of the richness and diversity of life as the 
over-riding ethical goal.  We believe that our proposal holds the most promise for 
unifying the rich plurality of ethics perspectives into a consensus regarding operational 
policies for space exploration and astrobiology research.   
 
A second consideration in support of our proposal is what we call the “cosmic Golden 
Rule.”   All of the Earth’s global religions contain some version of the “Golden Rule”.  
We prefer the Confucian version of the Golden Rule, which frames it as a prohibition:  
“Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself.” (Confucius, 1998) 
The most likely discovery scenarios for extraterrestrial life involve non-intelligent, non-
sentient life.  Clearly such extraterrestrial life discoveries would be inferior to humans in 
terms of intelligence, technology, and power.  As the vastly superior species, humans 
possess the capability to shape and change extraterrestrial ecosystems as we desire.  
Humans would essentially have god-like power over these forms of extraterrestrial life.  
However, it is clearly possible that elsewhere in this vast universe there are species with 
vastly superior intelligence and technology than that of humans; that is, these superior 
extraterrestrials would have god-like power over humans.   
 
If a superior species visited Earth, we would hope that their expedition was guided by 
ethical principles that promoted the flourishing of Earth-life and a policy of no harm with 
the evolutionary process unfolding on Earth.  We would want these superior 
extraterrestrials to carry-out their mission in a way that allowed the coexistence of 
terrestrial life, promoted the continued flourishing of that life, and sustained its diverse 
ecosystems.  If this is an accurate description of human expectations for a superior, 
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extraterrestrial visitor to Earth, then logically that should be the standard for our 
treatment of any inferior extraterrestrial life that we encounter in space missions.   
 
Another way to think about the “cosmic Golden Rule” is to shift our focus in time.  
Instead of imagining what our expectations would be for superior extraterrestrials visiting 
Earth in the present, imagine our expectations if these superior extraterrestrials had 
visited Earth several billion years ago, just as life was first emerging from the primordial 
soup of Earth.  In this scenario, we can presume that these superior extraterrestrials would 
visit Earth for reasons similar to our current interests in space exploration, including 
scientific research, the search for minerals and other useful resources, and perhaps 
tourism.  If these extraterrestrials were not guided by an adequate ethic and operational 
principles, then it is reasonable to posit that they could have interfered with life and 
emerging ecosystems, disrupting the evolutionary process so that life on Earth—
including human life—would not evolve as we know it.  Perhaps, life would never have 
evolved and humans would never have existed.  By contrast, if these superior 
extraterrestrials had followed our proposed ethic, with its goal of protecting and 
expanding the richness and diversity of life, then the evolutionary process would not have 
been disturbed.  The “cosmic Golden Rule” holds that we should not treat inferior 
extraterrestrials differently from the way in which we would want superior 
extraterrestrials to treat us.  Our proposed ethic would uphold this “cosmic Golden Rule,” 
and this is an important consideration in support of our proposal. 
 
We recognize the challenge inherent in determining how to best assist alien life we might 
find on another planet so that it does flourish and contribute to the richness and diversity 
of life in the universe.  This is a hard question with both ecological and evolutionary 
implications.  However, a teleological ethic, such as we propose, sets out a direction and 
a goal, which practical decisions and actions should support.  Of course, we may make 
mistakes along the way, especially when we first discover extraterrestrial life.  But, 
practical mistakes in implementation do not undermine the overall validity of an ethical 
approach.  Acknowledging these challenges of knowing how to best assist alien life, we 
still commend our ethic of protecting and expanding the richness and diversity of life. 
 
A Possible Objection and Our Reply 
 
Inevitably, there will be objections to any new ethics proposal.  While there may be other 
challenges to our ethics framework, perhaps the most serious objection is against our 
claim that all living organisms have intrinsic value.  To understand this objection’s 
background, it is helpful to look at the discussion concerning intrinsic value in 
(terrestrial) environmental ethics. The question of whether nonhuman life has intrinsic 
value is extremely contentious – actually, something of a ‘tug of war’ – among 
environmental ethicists.    Many environmental ethicists argue that nonhuman life does 
have intrinsic value, but they frequently disagree on what that means.  For example, 
Taylor (1986) has argued that each individual organism is vested with intrinsic value, 
whereas others see intrinsic value only in ecological systems.    Another philosopher, 
Rolston (1988), argues that organisms, species, and ecosystems all have intrinsic value 
because they are “projective”.    He writes, “...systemic nature is valuable intrinsically as 
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a projective system, with humans only one sort of its projects, though perhaps the 
highest.  The system is of value for its capacity to throw forward (pro-ject) all the storied 
natural history.”   For Rolston, this "projective" characteristic grounds an argument for 
intrinsic value. 
 
Other environmental ethicists deny that nonhuman life has intrinsic value.  Among this 
group, Thompson (1990) has argued that any ethic which ascribes intrinsic value to 
nonhuman individuals, species, or eco-systems “is not properly ethics at all,” and she 
proposes an alternative environmental ethic.  Thompson’s critique of intrinsic value 
focuses on the “demarcation problem.”  This problem arises if an ethical system fails to 
delineate viable criteria for demarcating what has intrinsic value from what does not 
have.  As Thompson summarizes:  “The problem… is that how we view the world, how 
we divide it up into individuals and systems, what we regard as good or bad for an 
individual or a system is too arbitrary—i.e., too dependent on point of view, interest, and 
convenience—to support an ethic that purports to be based on value in nature 
independent of our interests and concerns.”   Since Thompson’s article, several 
philosophers have proposed alternative theories of intrinsic value, which they believe can 
successfully overcome this “demarcation problem.”   Further, Samuelsson (2010a) has 
argued that Thompson’s alternative proposal is itself vulnerable to the “demarcation 
problem,” which she so powerfully used to criticize intrinsic value.  
 
In a recent essay “The Trouble with Intrinsic Value:  An Ethical Primer for 
Astrobiology,” Smith (2009) provides the type of objection which we see as serious, yet 
unpersuasive, for our ethics proposal.  Smith argues that intrinsic value must draw a clear 
“line in the sand” to protect humans who are the “fundamental units of ethical analysis.”   
He argues:  “The problem is that … the more entities are said to have intrinsic value, the 
more difficult it becomes to make any ethical decision, since instrumental tradeoffs are 
not allowed.  Intrinsic value is a powerful ethical tool, but it must be used sparingly.”   
For Smith, the core ethics question is determining who is entitled to ethical consideration 
at all.  Smith holds that only “ratio-centric” beings can have intrinsic value because 
rationality is a prerequisite for social functioning.   
 
We have a number of replies to Smith’s position but we think one is sufficient to 
demonstrate why we find his critique unpersuasive. Whereas we see intrinsic value as 
establishing a baseline of respect in which to begin ethical reflection, Smith sees it as a 
means for demarcating what is worthy of ethical consideration and what is not worthy, 
and he seems to believe that this is a sufficient criterion for ethical analysis in 
astrobiology.  Smith illustrates his point by asking readers to imagine a rather extreme 
situation in which he is stranded in a lifeboat with his son and his dog, Cleo.  “Suppose 
further,” Smith writes, “that we are all on the verge of dying of dehydration and it seems 
rescue cannot possibly arrive in time to save us.  What should we do?”  For Smith the 
answer is clear, even though he loves Cleo the dog, she must go overboard because she is 
not “ratio-centric” and does not have intrinsic value.  As Smith sees it, the advantage of 
restricting intrinsic value to rational creatures is that it prevents a lot of “haggling over 
who is more valuable, etc.”   We agree that under these extreme circumstances the dog 
would have to be sacrificed.  In our ethics proposal the dog would be sacrificed only as a 
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last resort and still respecting her intrinsic value as a living creature.  In sacrificing Cleo 
the dog, we would not undermine our overarching goal of protecting and expanding the 
richness and diversity of life because there are plenty of dogs on the Earth.  So, the 
decision of which living organism to sacrifice would be based on instrumental human 
value, even while recognizing the intrinsic value of Smith, his son, and Cleo the dog.  
 
Suppose, however, that Cleo were Smith’s daughter, instead of his dog.  In this scenario, 
it is postulated that one human would have to be sacrificed so that the other two could 
survive, but for Smith the dilemma cannot be ethically resolved by how he draws the 
boundary of what has intrinsic value and what is excluded.  For Smith, all three humans 
have intrinsic value so he must appeal to some other consideration for determining who 
will live and who will be thrown overboard.  But, Smith has no other criterion to which 
he can appeal.  Suppose Smith decides to throw himself overboard, reasoning that he has 
lived much of his life already, whereas his children’s lives are filled with potential for the 
future.  Does this mean that Smith has no intrinsic value?  Of course not.  In fact, most of 
us would see Smith’s act as a noble act of generosity for his children.  To conclude, we 
are skeptical of Smith’s claim that the core ethical question for astrobiology resolves 
around determining who is in and who is out of ethical consideration—or that he 
successfully resolves these dilemmas by ascribing intrinsic value only to “ratio-centric” 
humans.   
 
As we suggested above, the image of a philosophical “tug of war” comes to mind when 
one begins reading all of the arguments and counter-arguments regarding intrinsic value.  
On the one hand, we believe that very significant issues are at stake in this debate 
concerning intrinsic value.  On the other hand, this debate is now over 25 years old, with 
no prospect of resolution in the foreseeable future.  In the meantime, the development of 
an ethic for space exploration needs immediate attention if it is to help inform new 
COSPAR guidelines and policies.  How do we resolve this stalemate?  We agree with a 
statement by Samuelsson (2010b), writing on environmental ethics:  “The question of 
whether or not, and in what sense, nature has intrinsic value does not stand in contrast to 
questions of finding workable solutions to environmental problems.  To the contrary, 
such questions can often go hand in hand.”  We believe this applies to the development of 
an ethic concerning space exploration as well.  While continued debate on intrinsic value 
is important, we must simultaneously push forward on developing an ethic for space 
exploration.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have tried to build a comprehensive argument for an astrobiology ethic 
that promotes the goal of protecting and expanding the richness and diversity of life. 
Although we have tried to be comprehensive, we recognize that this is not the final word 
on an astrobiology ethic.  Ultimately, a true ethic must come through discussion and 
eventual consensus of astrobiologists, policy-makers, and the people who financially 
support astrobiology.  A true ethic must also reflect what we discover about life on other 
worlds. Right now, we are beginning to develop an ethic from a position of ignorance 
concerning extraterrestrial life.  It would be very surprising if what we conceive now is 
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unaltered by the actual discovery of life on another world.  As humans continue to 
explore space and as we begin to discover extraterrestrial life, then we will continually 
need to re-think and refine our ethic. So, what we hope to accomplish with this article is 
to establish a place to begin, to frame the ethical questions and provoke the discussion 
which must occur and must be informed by astrobiologists.  This discussion must be 
ongoing, and it must shape the new operational policies adopted by COSPAR. 
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